The top Balkan news of the week – the deal reached between the prime ministers of Macedonia and Greece over the name of the Republic of Macedonia seems to have again fueled tensions in the Balkans. The announced step forward and the name “Republic of North Macedonia” were hailed by the leaders of EU, NATO, USA and Russia. Bulgaria voiced support too, although it insists on political guarantees that the new name shall not be interpreted as a reason for possible change of existing borders or for claims to neighbors in terms of language, culture, history and identity. And though the news was good, a veritable political storm has broken out in the ranks of the two sides to the dispute. The Greek prime minister has come under threat of a no confidence vote, and the president and the prime minister of Macedonia have exchanged biting remarks.

It looks as though the Balkans has become the scene of tensions even before such a deal has been signed. Is this so?

“Tensions were indeed expected,” comments Martin Minkov who has spent many years as Bulgarian National Radio correspondent in Skopje. “I would not say that tensions are in the Balkans. Well, of course, they are a fact in the region as they have to do with the two countries directly engaged in this process – Macedonia and Greece. The political situation in those two countries has become very tense. In the Greek parliament a vote of no confidence is being discussed which has been demanded by the main opposition party Nea Demokrartia. Though not showing great numerical strength there have been daily protests of extreme nationalist circles outside the parliament’s building in Macedonia. Tensions do exist.”

Martin Minkov termed “drastic” the conduct of Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov who in practice refused to talk with Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and Foreign Minister Nikola Dimitrov when they went to acquaint him with the agreements reached with Greece.

“The conduct of Mr. Ivanov was drastic because he put an end to the meeting after 120 seconds. I find this unprecedented – he said that he would not place his signature as head of state on this document so as to give a start to its ratification. It comes out that he has refused to sign it even before he has read it. Even more surprising for me and probably for others, was the decision of Gjorge Ivanov, hours after that meeting in Skopje, to come to Sofia trying to make his position legitimate. His plan failed, though. The Bulgarian President Rumen Radev termed “tough” the conversation with his Macedonian counterpart. In their conversation Radev has declared clearlyand unambiguously Bulgaria’s support for Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic perspective. Using the diplomatic speak Gjorge Ivanov was told that his position is not shared because him blocking the future agreement would leave Macedonia in the capsule in which it was kept in isolation by the former government of VMRO-DPMNE. In addition to this, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov turned down the Macedonian president, who volunteered for talks with him, with very clear arguments – such a meeting would drag Bulgaria into a very stormy internal political dispute which is a problem of Macedonia’s society. Such a move would be interpreted as an interference of Bulgaria in the domestic affairs of Macedonia, all the more so that this country is currently holding the rotating presidency of the Council of EU which explicitly supports the deal reached with Greece. So, if there is a political blunder, it is in the fact that though planned in advance, the visit of Gjorge Ivanov to Bulgaria took place at all. Given this very tense situation both in Skopje and Athens, Gjorge Ivanov had a good reason to ask for a delay of his preliminary arranged visit to Bulgaria. However, he did not do that. On the contrary – he tried to make his stance legitimate here.”

At the meeting in Sofia of the two presidents, Rumen Radev has demanded guarantees for Bulgaria that the new name would not hurt its interests.

“A possible new name, North Macedonia, is not the very best option for Bulgaria but it is about compromise and where there is compromise full satisfaction is unlikely. This compromise would contribute to something which is among the priorities of Bulgaria – the beginning of the actual European integration process of Macedonia.

Guarantees, yes, we need them, although the agreement (I have read it) which was declassified last night by the government of Macedonia, has a clause saying that the agreement in no way pertains to the relations with third countries of the two countries committed to the agreement. This is according to international standards and implies certain guarantees. It is more important to make sure that as the name of the Republic of Macedonia changes, the respective annex to the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbor Relations of Bulgaria and Macedonia will specify that the two countries have no and shall admit no claims whatsoever regarding language, identity, history, etc. It is not easy to achieve such a clause but the relatively negative implications for Bulgaria of the name North Macedonia should not be exaggerated either. In today’s world this name in itself cannot provide viable ground for claims on behalf of any government in Skopje on Bulgaria’s Pirin section of the geographic region of Macedonia.”

What is the realistic scenario for the development of the situation and for ending the saga with the name of Macedonia?

“The big success of Bulgaria during its first EU Presidency is putting the problems of the Western Balkans on the EU agenda, and the insistence on keeping the European perspective of those countries. However the developments in the recent days, the hardships on the way of reaching a deal between Skopje and Athens over the new name and the vocal reactions of extreme nationalist and wider public circles both in Skopje and Athens suggest that the region remains problematic. There is too much history and too many emotions in this region. From this point of view any surprising development is possible. Personally, I think there is still a 50-50 chance that a final compromise will be reached between Athens and Skopje, that is, that the provisions in the agreement paving the road of Macedonia to NATO and EU will become reality. No less realistic however is the prospect of seeing the process blocked. It could be blocked by a possible fall of the Tsipras government, though I do not think this will happen. The agreement could be blocked in another way – by making its ratification and entering into force very difficult which would in the end make it pointless. Both scenarios are possible from the stand point of today.”

English Daniela Konstantinova